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Consumer reactions to corporate tax strategies: the role of political 
ideology 
 
ABSTRACT 
     This study contributes to research on how stakeholders react to corporate tax strategies 
(CTSs). In two experiments we show that consumers are more likely to react negatively to 
‘aggressive’ rather than to reward ‘conservative’ CTSs. The impact of CTSs on consumer 
reactions is mediated by the perceived ethicality of the firm and moderated by individuals’ 
political identification. Right-leaning consumers are less likely than left-leaning consumers to 
punish companies engaging in tax avoidance. This moderation depends on the personal 
connection customers have with a particular brand: both left-leaning and right-leaning 
consumers punish firms they feel close to when such firms engage in aggressive CTSs. The 
study extends our understanding of the benefits and risks associated with different CTSs. It 
contributes to debates on the morality of CTSs, showing that political ideology shapes 
individuals’ perceived ethicality of corporations engaged in aggressive tax avoidance. 
Keywords: Corporate tax avoidance; Corporate Social Responsibility; Moral Foundations 
Theory; Corporate reputation; Corporate Social Irresponsibility; Political Ideology. 
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1. Introduction 
There is increasing attention on the morality of corporate tax strategies (CTSs) that try to 
minimize as much as possible corporation’s tax liabilities (Dowling, 2014; Scheffer, 2013; 
Sikka, 2010). Global corporations are accused of exploiting national rules in order to pay low 
taxes on profits made in jurisdictions where they record high sales (Ting, 2014).  
Past research has focused mostly on the macro level (e.g., Scheffer, 2013) examining 
whether aggressive minimization strategies generate negative reactions from stakeholders 
that affect corporate performance. Some authors find an overall negative impact of aggressive 
CTSs on firm value (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009) while others find no significant overall 
impact (e.g., Gallemore et al., 2014). Few studies, however, examine how CTSs can affect 
psychologically organizational stakeholders (Huang and Watson, 2015). Hardeck and Hertl 
(2014) provide a first examination of how CTSs impact consumer behavior, showing that 
individuals are willing to punish companies adopting aggressive CTSs and likely to reward 
companies that do not plan proactively to minimize their tax burden.  
     Some scholars argue that tax planning decisions should be considered as part of an 
organization’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) profile (Dowling, 2014; Sikka, 2010; 
Scheffer, 2013). Companies with a poor CSR record are in fact more likely to employ 
aggressive CTSs (Hoi et al., 2013; Lanis and Richardson, 2015). To the best of our 
knowledge, however, no study has examined to what extent stakeholders’ reactions to CTSs 
are motivated by their inferences of corporate ethicality. Although scholars assume that tax 
planning leads to ethical judgments (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014), we test this assumption 
explicitly. Since organizations are increasingly keen to present their CTSs as responsible in 
the hope that it might engender positive effects (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Hardeck and Hertl, 
2014) it is important to probe that such expectation holds empirically. 
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     Tax research has shown that political beliefs do not influence individual tax compliance 
(Bobek et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011). Consequently, both right-leaning and left-leaning 
individuals condemn tax evasion. On the other hand, while many on the left condemn tax 
avoidance, it is common for right-wing politicians and commentators to justify the use of 
avoidance schemes (e.g., Scheiber and Cohen, 2015). This evidence is consistent with Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT) (Graham et al., 2009) that suggests the existence of systematic 
differences in the moral concerns of people with different political beliefs. On the basis of 
this theory we hypothesize that left-leaning consumers, more than right-leaning consumers, 
perceive aggressive CTSs as unethical. We also hypothesize that such moderation disappears 
when consumers evaluate companies they feel connected to (Escalas, 2004). In these 
circumstances, aggressive CTSs attract the condemnation of both right-leaning and left-
leaning consumers. 
     We propose a model of moderated-mediation that explains how individuals’ political 
ideology moderates the influence of different CTSs on consumers’ reactions. A deeper 
analysis of the psychology of stakeholders’ reactions to CTSs is necessary to enhance our 
understanding of under what circumstances reports of corporate tax avoidance can generate 
negative reactions from observers. Evidence that consumers make ethical inferences on the 
basis of tax information offers a further argument in support of the inclusion of tax planning 
within a company’s CSR profile (Dowling, 2014). Tax avoidance poses a serious threat to 
brand relationships. Even though consumers who share right-leaning beliefs in general have 
less negative reactions to tax avoidance, both right-leaning and left-leaning consumers are 
critical of aggressive strategies carried out by companies they feel close to. On the other 
hand, conservative CTSs have only a small beneficial effect for the adopter. From the 
perspective of aligning strategic decision-making and decisions about taxation (Glaister and 
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Hughes, 2008) the study offers a realistic assessment of the potential benefits and risks 
associated with different CTSs.  
     Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on CSR that studies cases of unethical 
corporate behavior (e.g., Grappi et al., 2013; Huber et al., 2010). Firstly, while past research 
focuses on clear cases of irresponsibility (e.g., Grappi et al., 2013), examining a practice 
which is not universally condemned, we highlight how judgments of ethicality are informed 
by: 1) the information presented, 2) the values of the observer, and 3) the relationship 
between the observer and the brand. Secondly, past studies analyzed how an observers’ 
relationships with the brand influences reactions to potentially questionable behavior (e.g., 
Trump, 2014). Our findings complement this approach by studying the interplay between 
(political) beliefs of the observer and his/her relationship with the company. Thus, the 
findings extend our analysis of how consumers make complex ethicality judgments.  
2. Research background 
2.1. Aggressive and Conservative CTSs 
     We conceptualize CTSs as corporate ‘efforts to minimize tax liabilities’ (Hardeck and 
Hertl, 2014: 310). CTSs range from illegal tax evasion to legal tax minimization (Culiberg 
and Bajde, 2014). Our focus rests on legal CTSs with a debatable ethical content. The 
adjective aggressive is commonly attributed to CTSs that are perceived as leaning towards a 
literal interpretation of regulation and consider acceptable the exploitation of legal loopholes 
Hoi et al., 2013). Conversely, conservative CTSs are perceived as in line with the intention of 
the legislator regardless of whether a literal interpretation would allow for a more effective 
(lower) tax liability (Dowling, 2014). We study how stakeholders perceive 
aggressive/conservative CTSs that are reported by the media (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014). 
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2.2. CTSs and stakeholders’ responses 
     Scholars suggest that stakeholders react negatively to aggressive CTSs. Social movements 
promote a fairer approach to business taxation (see Tax Justice Network, 2014) and critics 
point to the inconsistency between a ‘corporate citizenship’ discourse and the use of 
aggressive CTSs (Sikka, 2010). 
     Investors can also react negatively to aggressive CTSs (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). This 
effect appears dependent on external circumstances; especially the damaging effect that being 
branded as a tax shirker could have on consumer behavior (Cloyd et al., 2003). Contrasting 
evidence shows that aggressive CTSs do not have any adverse effect on organizational 
performance (Gallemore et al., 2014).  
     The conceptual argument that underpins much of existing normative research is that 
consumers will punish aggressive CTSs because they perceive them as unjust (Dowling, 
2014; Sikka and Willmot, 2013). Similarly, with conservative CTSs, individuals should 
reward companies who are perceived as acting fairly (Scheffer, 2013). In other words, CTSs 
influence consumers’ perception of the morality of an organization. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, there is no existing evidence that tests explicitly this assumption 
(Huang and Watson, 2015).  
     Brunk (2010; 2012) proposes a construct called Consumer Perceived Ethicality (CPE) as 
an overall assessment of an organization’s ethical conduct. She argues that consumers use a 
mixture of consequentialist and deontological arguments to assess the morality of a 
corporation. We hypothesize that aggressive CTSs are likely to skew such judgments in a 
negative direction, leading to lower perceptions of ethicality. Conservative CTSs should 
instead lead to a perception of increased ethicality.  
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H1a: Aggressive CTSs (when compared to a control) have a negative influence on the 
perceived ethicality of a target organization. 
H1b: Conservative CTSs (when compared to a control) have a positive influence on 
the perceived ethicality of a target organization. 
2.3. Consumers’ responses to aggressive versus conservative CTSs 
     Since tax rules represent codified legal obligations, the extent to which CTSs can 
represent examples of positive or negative CSR is debated (Hasseldine and Morris, 2013). 
Customers are less likely to reward companies’ CSR activities that they consider are caused 
by strategic or selfish motives (Skarmeas and Leonidou, 2013). Reports about conservative 
CTSs could be easily discounted by consumers. Taxation is a legal requirement which is 
enforced through, among others, administrative penalties for irregularities and cost/time-
consuming audits. Consequently, companies adopting conservative CTSs might be perceived 
as merely trying to minimize risks and costs rather than behaving ethically (Hasseldine and 
Morris, 2013). 
     Furthermore, because most consumers have a limited ability to understand the legal and 
moral intricacies of tax decisions, positive outcomes are more likely to be attributed to 
contextual circumstances, while negative outcomes to the character of the actor (Ybarra, 
2002). When motivations about the adoption of conservative CTSs are not provided, 
individuals might attribute these practices to external circumstances (e.g., legal risks) and 
therefore discount them as a sign of ethicality (Vonk, 1999). 
     Evidence provided by Hardeck and Hertl (2014), however, contradicts this argument. The 
authors document a positive, albeit small, effect of conservative CTSs on consumer reactions. 
Research on CSR supports this argument, showing that organizations can be punished as well 
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as rewarded for their ethical conduct (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Trudel & Cotte, 2009). 
Consequently, we hypothesize a positive (negative) effect of conservative (aggressive) CTSs, 
although we expect to observe differences on the relative impact of the two strategies 
(Hardeck and Hertl, 2014) 
H2a: Aggressive CTSs (when compared to a control) have a negative influence on 
attitudes towards the company and purchase intentions (PI), and a positive influence 
on negative word of mouth (NWOM). 
H2b: Conservative CTSs (when compared to a control) have a positive influence on 
attitudes towards the company and purchase intentions (PI), and a negative influence 
on negative word of mouth (NWOM). 
H3: Perceived ethicality mediates the influence of CTS condition on attitudes towards 
the company, purchase intentions (PI) and negative word of mouth (NWOM). 
2.4. Responses to CTSs: insights from MFT 
     Despite taxes being a common topic in political debates, there is limited evidence on how 
political views shape reactions to taxation. Empirical studies have demonstrated the positive 
attitudes toward tax compliance of individuals with a pro-democracy inclination (Torgler and 
Schneider, 2007) as well as its correlation with political factors like satisfaction for the 
democratic system and their politicians (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010), trust in 
governmental institutions (Cummings et al., 2009) and perceived effectiveness of public 
service delivery (Molero and Pujol, 2012). 
     Political ideology refers to the analysis of individual differences in values, attitudes and 
beliefs about society and politics (Jost et al., 2008). Individual political ideology is evaluated 
through political identification with a certain party that represents specific values and 
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political ideas (Mehrabian, 1996). In the Western tradition, political beliefs are organized 
around the left-right dimension (Bobbio, 1996). Li and colleagues (2011) examine whether 
political inclination has an effect on the likelihood of voluntary donations to private charities 
(i.e., philanthropy) versus donations to governmental authorities (i.e., taxes). The authors find 
no difference in attitudes between the two groups and argue that both right-leaning and left-
leaning individuals prefer voluntary giving to taxation because of a limited trust on the 
efficiency of the state. Another recent study finds no correlation between the political 
ideology of the participants and 1) their perception of fairness of taxation, 2) their norms in 
relation to taxes, and 3) their intentions to comply with tax regulations (Bobek et al., 2013). 
This evidence would suggest that, despite differing political views between left and right on 
the optimal size of the state and the role of government, individual attitudes towards tax 
compliance are not affected by political beliefs (see Everett, 2013). 
     Research on MFT shows how people on the right and people on the left differ predictably 
on the dimensions they use to make moral decisions (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt and Joseph, 
2004). While right-leaning individuals mostly evaluate morality on foundations of purity, 
respect for authority and support for the in-group, left-leaning individuals are most concerned 
with issues of harm and fairness (Graham et al., 2009). Aggressive CTSs are practices that 
potentially contradict the foundation of fairness. 
     This moral intuition supports non-kin solidarity (Haidt and Joseph, 2004). Individuals who 
score high on fairness consider equal treatment and the respect of general rules as particularly 
important (Jost et al., 2008). Aggressive CTSs are a direct challenge to the principle of 
mutual cooperation because they allow some companies to pay less tax than others and less 
than what was intended by the legislator (Dowling, 2014). Aggressive CTSs contradict a 
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moral narrative important to the political left that focuses on the reduction of inequality 
through institutions that eliminate or reduce exploitation in society (Smith, 2003).  
     Right-leaning individuals, on the other hand, have a higher acceptance of inequality (Jost 
et al., 2003) and show a tendency to justify the status quo (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2008). 
This does not mean that those on the right will not react negatively to aggressive CTSs. 
Fairness of treatment, although less important than other dimensions, still plays a role in 
right-wing morality (Graham et al., 2009). Furthermore, under certain circumstances, 
aggressive CTSs could also be construed as an issue of disloyalty to the in-group. When 
multinational companies shift some of their profits to jurisdictions with lower tax rates, they 
might be perceived as betraying the community that hosts their operations (see Johnson and 
Holub, 2003).  
     To the extent that conservative CTSs are perceived as a sign of CSR, it is also expected 
that those on the left would reward the adoption of such strategies more strongly. MFT 
suggests that any positive impact should be stronger for left-leaning consumers because the 
dimension of fairness is more important for them (Smith, 2003).  
H4: Left-leaning (right-leaning) consumers perceive CTSs as a strong (weak) sign of 
corporate ethicality and therefore have strong (weak) reactions to reports about CTSs. 
2.5. CTSs and brand relationships 
     Although left-leaning consumers are more likely to consider CTSs as a sign of unethical 
behavior, this pattern of evaluations might change when reports of CTSs affect a company 
that is strongly connected with the self (Escalas, 2004). In this case consumers are more 
likely to rely on their own personal interests and consider to what extent the newly acquired 
information affects them directly (Hunt et al., 2010). On the contrary, when tax policies are 
	 
	
11 
attributed to a company that one is not connected to, it is likely that the evaluation will focus 
more on the underlying moral principles (Hunt et al., 2010). 
     Research shows that consumers are often willing to overlook the negative information 
about companies they feel close to (Cheng et al., 2012). This buffering effect is a self-defense 
mechanism: criticism of a loved company is perceived as a threat to the self (Cheng et al., 
2012). Researchers have shown however that such a defensive reaction depends on the nature 
of the information provided. While product or service failures (e.g., product recalls, product 
defects) tend to be discounted, this is not the case for negative reports that have a moral 
content (e.g., racial discrimination, labor exploitation) (Folkes and Kamins, 1999; Trump, 
2014). Information about moral failings is able to deteriorate the quality of the relationship 
with a brand because it is considered more diagnostic of the character of the brand (Huber et 
al., 2010; Trump, 2014).  
H5: Consumers closely connected to a brand will react negatively to reports of 
aggressive CTSs and positively to reports of conservative CTSs regardless of their 
political identification.  
     Figure 1 summarizes our model of moderated mediation models in relation to both 
aggressive and conservative tax strategies. In Study 1 we test both models examining 
consumers’ reactions to a fictitious brand and manipulating information about CTSs. Study 2 
tests the same models in relation to real brands and varying the level of personal connection 
between consumers and the target company. In both studies we focus on three potential 
outcomes of exposure to reports about CTSs: attitude towards the brand, intentions to spread 
negative word of mouth (NWOM) and purchase intentions (PI). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
	 
	
12 
3. Study 1 
3.1. Method 
     We conducted a between-subjects experiment. Participants were presented with one of 
three versions of a company profile. The first two profiles manipulated the relevant CTS 
(aggressive or conservative) while the control condition contained no information about the 
tax practices of the firm. 439 participants were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) in exchange for $.75 (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). The survey lasted six 
minutes on average. We retained for analysis 402 complete surveys. The survey software 
randomly allocated participants to one of three conditions where they read a (fictitious) 
company profile. After this stage, participants answered a number of scales. To encourage 
participants’ attention, at the beginning of the survey we used an instructional manipulation 
check (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). All participants were US residents. 54% of our participants 
were male. 38% less than college educated, 48% held a college degree and 14% a graduate 
degree. 31% of the participants were aged between 18 and 29 years old, 50% between 30 and 
49 years old and 19% above 50.  
     Following Hardeck and Hertl (2014) we employed three profiles: an aggressive CTS, a 
conservative CTS and a control condition where no information about CTS was provided. We 
used a fictitious company and manipulated the relevant information about CTS on the basis 
of previous research (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014). Participants in the aggressive CTSs condition 
read of a company that “[…] has recently been the target of criticism […]” because it 
“implements complex tax planning strategies that allow paying very little tax to the IRS 
[Internal Revenue Service] compared to its revenues. The company’s tax strategies exploit 
loopholes in international regulations aggressively and allow FN1 to minimize its tax burden 
																																								 																				
1 Acronym of a fictitious company. 
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towards the IRS. Many of FN’s tax policies do not have real economic substance. In other 
words, they are simply accounting practices that allow the company to shift funds internally 
in order to minimize its tax liabilities towards the US authorities.” In the conservative CTSs 
condition participants read of a firm that “[..] has recently been praised […]” because of “a 
fair approach to taxation” that translates into paying “to the IRS an amount of taxes that is 
proportionate to its revenues. The company’s tax strategies do not exploit loopholes in 
international regulations and FN’s tax burden towards the IRS is in line with its overall 
revenues. All of FN’s tax strategies are based on transactions with real economic substance. 
In other words, the company does not employ accounting practices that manipulate its 
accounts artificially in order to minimize its tax liabilities towards the US authorities.” 
Participants considered the claims made in the scenario as clear (Maggressive = 5.79, Mconservative 
= 5.73, Mcontrol = 5.83, 1= unclear, 7= clear; F (2, 400) = .19, p = .827).  
      Scales from previous research were employed to measure the main constructs in our 
model. Perceived ethicality (α = .95; CR = .96; AVE = .83) was measured through the items 
developed by Brunk (2012). We adopted the measure of political ideology (α = .92; CR = 
.94; AVE = .71) developed by Mehrabian (1996). The scale was coded so that lower scores 
indicate left-leaning political beliefs. Attitudes towards the corporation (α = .95; CR = .96; 
AVE = .87) were measured on a 7-point scale and using the four items adopted by Hardeck 
and Hertl (2014). Negative word-of-mouth (α = .95; CR = .97; AVE = .90) was also 
borrowed from previous research (Grégoire and Fisher, 2006). The purchase intentions 
measure (α = .95; CR = .97; AVE = .91) was also consistent with previous research (e.g., 
Grappi et al., 2013). The reliability indicators were all above recommended thresholds 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981). All factor loadings were above .70 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) and 
good discriminant validity was demonstrated by the Maximum Shared Variance and Average 
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Shared Variance being lower than the AVE for all constructs (Hair et al., 2010). The Fornell-
Larcker criterion was also supported for all constructs. 
3.2. Results 
     We used the average of two items to check the effectiveness of the manipulations (e.g., 
“The company described engages in tax avoidance activities”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). We found that the different CTSs were correctly identified across the three 
experimental groups (Maggressive = 5.82; Mconservative = 2.03; Mcontrol = 2.80, F (2, 399) = 238.47, 
p < .001) and all paired comparisons yield statistically significant differences. 
     An ANOVA with planned contrasts assessed the effects of different CTSs (Table 1). 
Consistent with H1a and H1b, aggressive (conservative) CTSs damage (improve) perceptions 
of company ethicality (F (2, 399) = 121.78, p < .001). Results also confirm a main effect in 
terms of attitudes (F (2, 399) = 78.52, p < .001). Consistent with our hypotheses, engaging in 
aggressive CTSs translates into potential negative word of mouth (F (2, 399) = 58.23, p < 
.001). Results for our purchase intentions measure show that aggressive strategies can have a 
clear damaging effect (F (2, 399) = 49.09, p < .001) although planned contrasts show that 
conservative CTSs do not have a direct effect on this measure. Comparisons across the three 
conditions also show that conservative CTSs are evaluated significantly better than 
aggressive CTSs. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
     Using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013, model 7) we estimated two moderated mediation models: 
one for the aggressive condition and one for the conservative condition. The dichotomous 
independent variable compares the manipulations (coded as “1”) versus the control condition 
(coded as “-1”). We calculated 95% confidence intervals using bias-corrected and accelerated 
bootstrap with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013). In each case we compared the relevant CTS 
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condition to the control, the two models were estimated on 272 and 265 cases respectively 
(Table 2). In order to estimate the impact on our three outcomes we ran three separate 
models, one for each dependent variable. In both sets of models, political ideology, 
consistently with H4, moderates the relationship between CTS and CPE. All our research 
hypotheses are supported by the data. In general, the adoption of aggressive (conservative) 
CTSs produces negative (positive) consequences in terms of 1) attitudes towards the 
company, 2) word of mouth, and 3) purchase intentions. Across all three models, this effect 
appears to be mediated by CPE, consistently with H2a, H2b and H3.   
     Conditional indirect effects (Table 3) show that, while both left-leaning and right-leaning 
consumers have a negative reaction towards aggressive CTSs and a positive view of 
companies adopting conservative CTSs; the former are much more sensitive to this issue. 2 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
3.3. Discussion 
     The findings support our conceptual model. Consumers draw moral judgments about the 
ethicality of the firm from information about CTS. In turn, CPE mediates consumers’ 
reactions (H3). While reports of aggressive CTSs have a strong negative influence on 
consumer reactions (H2a), the evidence of a positive effect of conservative CTSs in line with 
H2b is much weaker. Evidence of a positive indirect effect of conservative CTSs on our 
dependent variables, supports our conceptual model (Zhao et al., 2010). However, 
conservative CTSs appear to have only an indirect effect on purchase intentions through the 
mediation of perceived ethicality. This finding is consistent with past research on CSR 
																																								 																				
2 We estimated the models introducing age, gender and level of education as covariates. Findings are robust to 
the introduction of these controls.  
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(Trudel and Cotte, 2009) as well as Hardeck and Hertl’s (2014) analysis of how German 
consumers react to information about CTSs.  
     Despite past research findings, that political views do not influence attitudes towards 
individual tax compliance (Bobek et al., 2013), our study shows that political ideology 
moderates how individuals react to media reports about CTSs (H4). Although both right-
leaning and left-leaning consumers are critical, the effect is much stronger for the latter 
group. Also, those with left-wing views are more likely to reward companies who implement 
conservative CTSs. The study presented, however, examined participants’ reactions towards 
a fictitious organization. To improve the external validity of our research we extended our 
analysis to reports that involve real brands. 
4. Study 2 
4.1. Method 
     We conducted a 3 (CTSs: aggressive, conservative, control) X 2 (self-brand connection: 
favorite, least favorite) between-subjects experiment. The experiment focused on sportswear 
brands. Participants were presented with a list of the twenty most popular sportswear brands 
(retrieved from www.statista.com). Out of these brands participants indicated those they are 
aware of and their favorite and least favorite option. To manipulate the second factor in our 
design, half of the participants evaluated CTSs’ information in relation to their favorite brand 
and the other half in relation to their least favorite brand. In the control condition, where no 
information about tax was provided, participants were simply asked to think about their 
perception of the brand for a few moments before proceeding with the survey. 328 
participants were recruited on AMT but we obtained 306 complete surveys used for analysis. 
The survey lasted on average nine minutes and participants were awarded 1$ for 
participation. All other procedures and sample requirements were consistent with Study 1. 
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51% of participants were male. In terms of education, 36% were less than college educated, 
52% held an undergraduate degree and 12% a graduate degree. Participants varied 
significantly also in terms of age. 29% between 18 and 29 years old, 50% between 30 to 49 
years old and 21% above 50.  
     With the exception of the name of the company, the information provided on CTSs was 
the same as that used in Study 1. Participants were asked to imagine that they had read the 
news about the company’s CTSs from “their favorite newspaper or other trusted source”. 
Participants rated the scenarios as clear (1= unclear, 7= clear; Maggressive = 5.48, Mconservative = 
5.88, F (2, 200) = 2.06, p = .106).  
     We adopted the same measures already used in Study 1. Reliability indicators were 
satisfactory for all constructs: CPE (α = .95; CR = .96; AVE = .84), political ideology (α = 
.93; CR = .94; AVE = .73), attitudes towards the corporation (α = .96; CR = .97; AVE = .89), 
negative word of mouth (α = .94; CR = .96; AVE = .89) and purchase intentions (α = .97; CR 
= .98; AVE = .95). All factor loadings for all scales were above .70 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) 
and we found evidence of good discriminant validity since the Maximum Shared Variance 
and Average Shared Variance were lower than the AVE for all measures (Hair et al., 2010) 
and the Fornell-Larcker criterion was supported for all constructs. 
4.2. Results 
     As in Study 1 the relevant CTSs are correctly decoded across the two experimental groups 
(Maggressive = 6.01; Mconservative = 2.09, t (202) = 18.7, p < .001). We also measured participants’ 
self-brand connection (Escalas, 2004) with the company evaluated in the experiment. As 
expected, participants have a stronger connection with their favored brands than with the least 
favorite alternatives (Mfavorite = 5.01; Mleast favorite = 1.89, t (304) = 21.5, p < .001). 
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     To test our hypotheses, we ran a series of 2 X 3 ANOVAs using planned contrasts to 
compare the effect of the tax conditions compared with the control on the outcome variables. 
All descriptive statistics across conditions are presented in Table 4. As expected we found a 
main effect of CTSs on CPE (F (2, 300) = 97.04, p < .001). Planned contrasts indicate that 
companies engaging in conservative (aggressive) CTSs are perceived as relatively more (less) 
ethical than the control, while companies practicing aggressive CTSs are considered less 
ethical than the control. Consistently with Study 1, we also find that conservative CTSs are 
evaluated better than aggressive CTSs and all differences between these two groups are 
statistically significant. Unsurprisingly there is also a main effect of company condition (F (1, 
300) = 48.91, p < .001). Finally, there is a significant interaction between the two conditions 
(F (2, 300) = 4.47, p < .05). Similar results are obtained in relation to the measure of attitudes 
towards the company. Both the tax strategy condition (F (2, 300) = 28.43, p < .001) and the 
company condition (F (1, 300) = 28.42, p < .001) yield main effects and we find evidence 
again of a significant interaction (F (2, 300) = 3.72, p < .05). Consumers have a better 
evaluation of the company in the control condition when compared to the aggressive CTS and 
more positive attitudes towards the company in the conservative CTS than towards 
companies in the control condition. Results in terms of negative word of mouth also show a 
main effect of CTS (F (2, 300) = 27.11, p < .001), company condition (F (1, 300) = 20.64, p 
< .001) and a significant interaction (F (2, 300) = 4.32, p < .05). Consistent with our 
hypotheses, the use of aggressive CTSs increases the likelihood of negative word of mouth. 
Finally, purchase intentions are also influenced by CTSs (F (2, 300) = 7.57, p < .001) and 
company condition (F (1, 300) = 538.32, p < .001). The interaction term is not statistically 
significant (F (2, 300) = 2.39, p = .09). Planned contrasts show that while there is a negative 
effect of aggressive CTS, the adoption of conservative CTSs does not generate a direct 
positive effect.  
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     Taken together these results provide support for H1a, H1b and H2a. Although the absence 
of a direct effect of conservative CTSs on consumer reactions potentially challenges H2b, it 
is possible that consumer reactions are affected indirectly through the paths suggested by our 
model.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
     To estimate our conceptual model, we ran the same analysis conducted in Study 1. We 
used PROCESS, Model 7 (Hayes, 2013) with the same procedures discussed above. Table 5 
shows results of a series of regression models estimated comparing the CTSs conditions to 
the control for the three dependent variables (attitudes, negative word of mouth and purchase 
intentions). These analyses were conducted on a sample of 204 participants. CPE mediates 
consumer reactions, in line with H3. H4 is also supported because we find an interaction 
between political identification and the aggressive CTS condition. There is no evidence of 
moderation, however, in relation to conservative CTSs, a result that is not in line with Study 
1. Table 6 shows the indirect effects for the moderated mediation model of aggressive CTSs. 
Consistent with H4 we find stronger negative effects for left-leaning individuals. Even 
though there is no evidence that political ideology moderates the influence of conservative 
CTSs on ethicality, the indirect effect is statistically significant for attitude (effect: .42, CI 
from .26 to .60), negative word of mouth (effect: -.21, CI from -.35 to -.12) and purchase 
intentions (effect: .43, CI from .26 to .63). This evidence suggests a positive influence of 
conservative CTSs on consumer reactions consistent with our theorizing (Zhao et al., 2010). 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
     The same analysis was also conducted for both favorite and least favorite brands in order 
to test H5. We estimated our conceptual model on the sample of participants who evaluated 
	 
	
20 
their favorite brands (N=101 for aggressive CTSs and N=103 for conservative CTSs) and 
participants who evaluated their least favorite brands (N=103 for aggressive CTSs and 
N=101 for conservative CTSs). Consistent with our expectations, political identification does 
not moderate reactions to aggressive CTSs when a favorite brand is evaluated (interaction 
effect: .05, CI from -.06 to .17). However, the moderation is present when the model is 
estimated for least favorite brands (interaction effect: .12, CI from .04 to .20). The 
conditional indirect effects are presented in Table 7 and they are in line with H4. Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 present spotlight analyses that clearly show how 1) right-leaning participants’ 
leniency when evaluating the ethicality of a brand that engages in aggressive CTSs is absent 
when the consumers have a strong connection to the brand, 2) political identification does not 
affect judgments of ethicality in relation to conservative CTSs. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
4.3. Discussion 
     Results obtained from Study 2 examining real companies reflect the findings of Study 1 
for fictitious ones. We found support for H1a, H1b, H2a, H3 and partially H4. These results 
suggest that the reactions of consumers are mediated by CPE and moderated by political 
ideology.  
     H2b is also formally supported because there is evidence of a positive indirect effect of 
reports about conservative CTSs on consumer reactions (Zhao et al., 2010). However, 
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consistent with Study 1, the effect is small and therefore unlikely to generate significant 
positive returns. 
     Interestingly, the moderation of political ideology is not supported for conservative CTSs. 
This result is likely due to the fact that, when consumers evaluate fictitious brands as in Study 
1, the adoption of CSR practices is more indicative of ethicality than in circumstances when 
consumers have pre-existing beliefs about the brand (Jones et al., 2014: 399). Negative 
signals are more powerful than positive ones in a moral context (Baumeister et al., 2001). 
Skowronski and Carlston (1992) suggest that negative behaviors are always more diagnostic 
than positive moral actions. Hence, political ideology differentiates reactions to aggressive 
CTSs more reliably than reactions to conservative CTSs. 
     Finally, H5 is supported. Self-brand closeness eliminates the relative acceptance of right-
leaning observers for aggressive CTSs. This finding is in line with work by Trump (2014) 
showing that consumers close to a brand are willing to justify product-related failures but 
react negatively to moral-related failures. While the moderation of political ideology is 
present when assessing the CTSs of distal companies, both left-leaning and right-leaning 
individuals react negatively to aggressive CTSs by a close brand. Tax policies have a moral 
relevance for all consumers, irrespective of their political views.  
5. General discussion 
5.1. Implications for research 
     This study advances the tax literature in relation to stakeholders’ reactions to tax 
avoidance (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014). Despite inconsistent findings at the organizational level 
on how CTSs influence performance (Cloyd et al., 2003; Gallemore et al., 2014), we show 
that consumers have negative reactions to aggressive practices. Our evidence is in line with 
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work by Hardeck and Hertl (2014) and supports the view that engaging in aggressive CTSs 
poses serious risks (PwC, 2013). We extend previous tax research by clarifying the process 
underpinning this negative effect. CTSs affect judgments of ethicality and this assessment is 
moderated by the political ideology of the observer. Nonetheless even consumers with right-
leaning political views criticize companies close to the self when these engage in aggressive 
CTSs. This stresses the fact that tax avoidance presents significant risks for brand 
relationships. 
     Previous taxation research has shown that political views do not affect individuals’ 
attitudes towards personal compliance (Bobek et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011). We show that 
reactions to aggressive CTSs are based on different psychological processes from those that 
explain personal compliance. Political identification regulates reactions to CTSs (at least in 
the case of companies not connected to the self). Tax research needs to examine stakeholders’ 
reactions to CTSs as a separate field of study with implications for the psychology of CSR. 
     Our findings also contribute to the CSR literature by reinforcing an emerging trend 
highlighted in previous research: retaliations against irresponsible behavior are stronger than 
rewards for responsible conduct (Trudel and Cotte, 2009). Conservative CTSs, in fact, offer 
only a small and indirect benefit in terms of consumer reactions. Interestingly Hardeck and 
Hertl (2014) found, in a sample of German consumers, a stronger positive effect of 
conservative CTSs than the one we identify in this research. This is likely due to the fact that 
different countries have different attitudes towards taxation (Alm and Torgler, 2006) and 
consequently individuals might have different views on the responsibility of corporations as 
taxpayers. Future research should investigate cross-cultural reactions to CTSs, since tax 
regulation is increasingly shaped in multi-state arenas (e.g., OECD) and CTSs are often 
implemented in a plurality of national settings (Lipatov, 2012).  
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     A further contribution to the CSR literature rests in the analysis of how characteristics of 
the observers (i.e. political beliefs), information about unethical behavior (i.e., aggressive 
CTSs) and pre-existing relationships with the brand interact to shape judgments of ethicality. 
Past research tends to focus on clear cases of irresponsible corporate behavior (e.g., Grappi et 
al., 2013). Some areas of corporate practice however lead to more complex moral judgments 
and consumers’ interpretation of these practices might involve, as in the case of CTSs, a mix 
of personal and contextual variables. We contend that further research examining directly 
what shapes perceptions of ethicality will contribute to both theory and practice by 
identifying areas that risk generating negative stakeholder reactions. 
     In this respect, we find that personal beliefs (political ideology) can be less important than 
brand relationships in defining what is ethically salient. Right-leaning consumers, who 
usually are less concerned about tax avoidance, react as negatively as left-leaning consumers 
when companies they feel close to engage in aggressive CTSs. This finding stresses the 
importance of examining (political) beliefs in context and reflect on the circumstances that 
shape subtly moral judgments. 
5.2. Implications for practice 
     Our results suggest that showcasing a conservative tax conduct might “improve(s) the 
reputation and perceived trustworthiness of your business” (Fair Tax Mark, 2015). However, 
companies should expect only minimal returns from the adoption of conservative CTSs. That 
said, we believe that moral considerations should encourage the adoption of conservative 
CTSs in all cases; while from a more pragmatic view the adoption of conservative CTSs is an 
insurance against potential consumer backlash that is likely to be caused by aggressive CTSs 
(PwC, 2013).  
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     The findings presented are especially salient for organizations whose target market tends 
to include consumers with left-leaning political views or whose brand image is associated 
with liberal beliefs. Although political ideology is not necessarily a variable used commonly 
in segmentation studies, examinations of consumer values (Kamakura and Novak, 1992) can 
highlight potential risks for organizations. If potential customers value social justice highly 
then reports on aggressive CTSs could be very damaging for the organization’s ability to 
expand its customer base. 
     When considering existing customers, the results indicate that companies should pay 
particular attention to how CTSs are reported in the media because aggressive CTSs appear to 
be perceived very negatively by all consumers who feel closely connected to the brand, 
irrespective of their political views. 
5.3. Limitations and areas for further research 
     We present cross-sectional data. Longitudinal studies could explore the duration of 
negative or positive effects generated by information about CTSs. Furthermore, consumers 
were informed about CTSs by the report they read. It is possible that the pre-existing level of 
knowledge of tax regulations might also affect consumers’ reactions (Sen et al., 2006).  
     In this study we focused on one type of CTS (i.e., profit shifting). This practice is arguably 
the easiest to grasp and has been the focus of recent media coverage. Future research could 
explore consumers’ reactions to less stigmatized types of CTSs.  
     Future research could also examine whether and how the differing views of right-leaning 
and left-leaning consumers on the issue of tax avoidance could be reconciled (see Kidwell et 
al., 2013). Future work could explore ways to reduce the political segmentation currently 
identified in reactions to media reports about CTSs. It is interesting to notice however that the 
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different evaluations between right-leaning and left-leaning consumers disappear when 
individuals consider brands close to the self. This insight is worthy of further investigation in 
CSR research. It would be interesting to examine in more depth how and to what extent 
building a relationship with a brand leads to an expansion of the moral expectations 
consumers have towards the company (Trump, 2014). This is a research domain that 
promises to generate important implications for scholars and practitioners. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual models 
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Figure 2: Interaction of Aggressive CTS and political identification for favorite and 
least favorite brands 
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Figure 3: Interaction of Conservative CTS and political identification for favorite and 
least favorite brands 
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Table 1: Means across conditions (Study 1) 
 
Aggressive 
CTSs condition 
(N = 137) 
Conservative 
CTSs condition 
(N = 130) 
Control CTSs 
condition 
(N = 135) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Perceived 
ethicality 3.10
** 1.39 5.30** 1.06 4.46 1.00 
Attitudes 3.34** 1.68 5.36** 1.23 5.00 1.28 
NWOM 3.82** 1.77 2.12 1.15 2.28 1.25 
Purchase 
intentions 3.30
** 1.62 4.81 1.23 4.63 1.20 
** indicate that the values are significantly different from the control at the p <.01 significance level. Pairwise 
comparisons calculated using planned contrasts. 
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Table 2: Moderated-mediation model (Study 1) 
CTS Path Estimate 
Aggressive CTS 
 
N = 272 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à Perceived ethicality -1.03** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à Attitudes -.20** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à PI -.04NS 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à NWOM .26** 
Perceived ethicality à Attitudes .93** 
Perceived ethicality à PI .91** 
Perceived ethicality à NWOM -.74** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control * Political identification à 
Perceived ethicality .08
* 
Conservative CTS 
 
N = 265 
Conservative CTS vs Control à Perceived ethicality .71** 
Conservative CTS vs Control à Attitudes -.18** 
Conservative CTS vs Control à PI .19** 
Conservative CTS vs Control à NWOM -.24** 
Perceived ethicality à Attitudes .85** 
Perceived ethicality à PI .79** 
Perceived ethicality à NWOM -.65** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control * Political identification à 
Perceived ethicality -.06
* 
* indicates that the value is significant at p <.05 significance level. ** indicates that the value is significant at p 
<.01 significance level, NS indicates that p >.05. Unstandardized beta values reported. Model estimated using 
PROCESS, Model 7 (Hayes, 2013). 
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Table 3: Conditional indirect effects (Study 1) 
  Left-leaning 
 
(-1 SD) 
Moderates 
 
Mean 
Right-leaning 
 
(+1 SD) 
Aggressive 
tax strategy 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à Attitudes 
-.80 
(CI from -.98 
to -.62) 
-.65 
(CI from -.78 
to -.52) 
-.49 
(CI from -.68 
to -.29) 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à NWOM 
.64 
(CI from .48 
to .83) 
.52 
(CI from .39 
to .67) 
.39 
(CI from .23 
to .58) 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à PI 
-.78 
(CI from -.97 
to -.60) 
-.63 
(CI from -.76 
to -.51) 
-.48 
(CI from -.66 
to -.29) 
Conservative 
tax strategy 
Conservative tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à Attitudes 
.48 
(CI from .31 
to .69) 
.36 
(CI from .24 
to .49) 
.23 
(CI from .09 
to .38) 
Conservative tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à NWOM 
-.37 
(CI from -.56 
to -.22) 
-.27 
(CI from -.41 
to -.17) 
-.17 
(CI from -.30 
to -.07) 
Conservative tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à PI 
.45 
(CI from .29 
to .63) 
.33 
(CI from .23 
to .45) 
.21 
(CI from .08 
to .35) 
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Table 4: Means across conditions (Study 2) 
 Aggressive 
CTSs 
condition 
Conservative 
CTSs 
condition 
Control 
condition Favorite brands 
Least favorite 
brands 
 N= 102 N= 102 N= 102 N= 153 N= 153 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Perceived 
ethicality 3.19
** 1.44 5.25** 0.99 4.44 0.99 4.71** 1.36 3.88 1.39 
Attitudes 3.56** 1.82 4.85* 1.60 4.48 1.83 5.45** 1.45 3.15 1.39 
NWOM 3.54** 1.69 2.19 1.25 2.49 1.37 2.39 1.42 3.09** 1.61 
PI 3.63** 2.01 4.18 1.86 4.11 2.09 5.55** 1.23 2.39 1.22 
* indicates that the value is statistically different from the 
control at p < .05, ** indicates that the value is statistically 
different from the control at p < .01 
** indicates that the value is statistically 
different at p < .01 
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Table 5: Moderated-mediation model (Study 2) 
CTS Path Estimate 
Aggressive CTS 
 
N = 204 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à Perceived ethicality -1.02** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à Attitudes .17NS 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à PI .47** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control à NWOM .16NS 
Perceived ethicality à Attitudes 1.01** 
Perceived ethicality à PI 1.14** 
Perceived ethicality à NWOM -.59** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control * Political identification à 
Perceived ethicality .09
* 
Conservative CTS 
 
N = 204 
Conservative CTS vs Control à Perceived ethicality .37** 
Conservative CTS vs Control à Attitudes -.23** 
Conservative CTS vs Control à PI -.39** 
Conservative CTS vs Control à NWOM .06NS 
Perceived ethicality à Attitudes 1.05** 
Perceived ethicality à PI 1.06** 
Perceived ethicality à NWOM -.53** 
Aggressive CTS vs Control * Political identification à 
Perceived ethicality -.01
NS 
* indicates that the value is significant at p <.05 significance level. ** indicates that the value is significant at p 
<.01 significance level, NS indicates that p >.05. Unstandardized beta values reported. Model estimated using 
PROCESS, Model 7 (Hayes, 2013). 
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Table 6: Conditional indirect effects for the entire sample (Study 2) 
  Left-leaning 
 
(-1 SD) 
Moderates 
 
Mean 
Right-leaning  
 
(+1 SD) 
Aggressive 
tax strategy 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à Attitudes 
-.93 
(CI from -1.21 
to -.65) 
-.69 
(CI from -.91 
to -.49) 
-.46 
(CI from -.77 
to -.17) 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à NWOM 
.48 
(CI from .29 
to .70) 
.35 
(CI from .22 
to .52) 
.24 
(CI from .09 
to .43) 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à PI 
-.93 
(CI from -1.22 
to -.65) 
-.69 
(CI from -.91 
to -.50) 
-.46 
(CI from -.78 
to -.17) 
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Table 7: Conditional indirect effects for least favorite brands (Study 2) 
  Left-leaning 
 
(-1 SD) 
Moderates 
 
Mean 
Right-leaning  
 
(+1 SD) 
Aggressive 
tax strategy 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à Attitudes 
-.66 
(CI from -.84 
to -.49) 
-.44 
(CI from -.61 
to -.29) 
-.22 
(CI from -.47 
to -.009) 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à NWOM 
.48 
(CI from .29 
to .70) 
.35 
(CI from .22 
to .52) 
.24 
(CI from .09 
to .43) 
Aggressive tax strategy à 
Perceived Ethicality à PI 
-.62 
(CI from -.83 
to -.44) 
-.42 
(CI from -.59 
to -.28) 
-.21 
(CI from -.46 
to -.009) 
 
 
